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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
LEWIS, Circuit Judge. 
 
Defendants -- Omar Torres-Montalvo ("Montalvo"), Jorge 
Luis Pacheco ("Pacheco"), Randy Alvarez-Quinones 
("Quinones"), Milton Palma-Ruedas ("Palma-Ruedas"), Jairo 
Pedroza-Ortiz ("Ortiz"), and Jacinto Rodriguez-Moreno 
("Moreno") -- appeal their convictions on charges arising 
from a drug conspiracy and kidnapping scheme. All six 
defendants were convicted by a jury in the United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey of kidnapping 
and conspiracy to kidnap, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1201(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 1201(c). Montalvo, Pacheco, 
and Quinones were also convicted of conspiracy to 
distribute and possess cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 
§ 846. In addition, Moreno was convicted of using and 
carrying a firearm in relation to a crime of violence, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). In this consolidated 
appeal, defendants challenge their convictions on 
numerous grounds. We will discuss each of these 
challenges in turn, focusing in more detail on Moreno's 
claim that venue in New Jersey was improper to try the 
§ 924(c)(1) count. 
 
We will conclude that venue was improper in New Jersey 
and, accordingly, we will reverse Moreno's conviction under 
 
                                4 
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). We will affirm the defendants' 
convictions on all other counts. 
 
I. 
 
Defendant Montalvo ran a cocaine distribution enterprise 
out of Texas. In July of 1994, Ephrain Avendano 
("Avendano"), the kidnapping victim, introduced Montalvo 
to Fanol Ochoa ("Ochoa"), a New York drug dealer, so that 
Montalvo and Ochoa could discuss a possible cocaine 
transaction. Thereafter, Avendano served as the middleman 
between Montalvo and Ochoa. 
 
In October of 1994, Montalvo and another defendant, 
Pacheco, arranged to sell Ochoa fourteen kilograms of 
cocaine. Avendano acted as the middleman in this deal. 
Montalvo hired Raul Lopez ("Lopez"), who later became a 
key witness for the government, and another friend to "do 
the run" from Texas to New York because Lopez owned a 
car with a secret compartment. On October 29, 1994, while 
en route to New York, Lopez was arrested and the fourteen 
kilos of cocaine were seized. Montalvo called Avendano to 
let him know that the deal had been thwarted and that he 
had hired lawyers to represent Lopez. 
 
In November of 1994, Montalvo and his cousin, 
Defendant Quinones, met with Avendano. Montalvo told 
Avendano that the seizure of the fourteen kilos and the 
legal fees were "a big loss" and that he needed to make a 
new deal to compensate for it. Avendano conveyed this 
information to Ochoa, who agreed to strike another deal 
with Montalvo for twenty kilograms of cocaine. Avendano, 
again acting as the middleman, agreed to fly to Houston 
and help Ochoa execute the deal with Montalvo. Avendano 
arrived in Houston on December 11, 1994, and was met at 
the airport by Ochoa and another man named "Baldy." 
Ochoa told Avendano that the deal had been increased to 
thirty kilograms of cocaine and that Montalvo had agreed to 
give Ochoa the extra ten kilograms on credit. Ochoa then 
informed Avendano of the plan to get the cocaine from 
Montalvo: Avendano and Baldy were to meet Montalvo, 
Baldy would put the cocaine in his car, and Avendano 
would call Ochoa, who would then deliver the money. 
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Ochoa explained that he was not meeting Montalvo 
personally because of "reasons of security." 
 
Pursuant to this plan, Montalvo and Pacheco met 
Avendano and Baldy. Baldy instructed Montalvo and 
Pacheco to place the thirty kilos of cocaine in a suitcase, 
and Baldy drove away with the drugs. When Avendano tried 
to execute the last phase of the deal -- to call Ochoa to 
secure payment for Montalvo -- Ochoa did not answer his 
pager. 
 
Obviously, Montalvo was not happy about being taken 
advantage of by Ochoa for the price of the drugs, which was 
nearly half-a-million dollars. And, in response, Montalvo 
and Pacheco informed Avendano that he was "responsible" 
for the money, warning him that they may have to turn him 
over to the "Medellin people." 
 
On December 12, 1994, Montalvo called Avendano's wife, 
Marbel Avendano, and told her that he was holding Mr. 
Avendano. Montalvo informed Mrs. Avendano that he could 
not let Mr. Avendano go until he found Ochoa because 
Avendano was "his only guarantee." Montalvo and Pacheco 
then moved Avendano to an apartment in Houston and 
then to a house. Avendano was kept in the house for two 
weeks. Montalvo was armed at all times. 
 
After hearing that Ochoa was in New York boasting about 
how he had "ripped-off " Montalvo, Montalvo forced 
Avendano to disclose the address of his mother and cousin 
in Columbia and the address of his home in New Jersey. 
Montalvo then informed Avendano that they were all going 
to travel to Avendano's home in New Jersey to continue the 
search for Ochoa. Montalvo warned Avendano not to try 
anything "because it could work out worse for him." 
 
That same day, Pacheco showed up at the apartment 
with three men, Defendants Ortiz, Palma-Ruedas, and 
Moreno, who had been hired to help look for Ochoa and 
keep Avendano captive. Ortiz, Palma-Ruedas, and Moreno 
travelled with Pacheco, Montalvo, and Avendano from Texas 
to New Jersey. They arrived in New Jersey at Avendano's 
apartment on December 28, 1994. Using Avendano's 
apartment as a home base, the defendants spent the next 
few days looking for Ochoa. 
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On January 1, 1994, they all went to Quinones's house 
in Newburgh, New York. Mrs. Avendano stayed at the 
Avendanos' apartment in New Jersey. Both Mr. Avendano 
and Mrs. Avendano testified at trial that at this point they 
thought they would never see each other again. 
 
Before Avendano arrived with Pacheco at Quinones's 
house, Montalvo had decided that the house was not safe 
because police had inquired about the car with Texas plates 
in the driveway. Montalvo then informed the group that 
they were going to travel to Maryland that night. As they 
got ready to leave, Montalvo told Avendano to carry the 
guns so that if they were pulled over on the way, Avendano 
would be responsible for the guns. 
 
Montalvo, Pacheco, and Avendano travelled in one car, 
and Ortiz, Palma-Ruedas, Moreno, and Quinones travelled 
in another. Early in the morning on January 2, 1995, they 
all arrived at a house in Maryland owned by Mr. Morillo. 
Soon after their arrival in Maryland, Morillo showed off his 
.357 magnum revolver to the men. Meanwhile, Montalvo 
continued his search for Ochoa from the house in 
Maryland. Once it became clear that Montalvo's search for 
Ochoa was fruitless, tensions among the men began to run 
high. At one point, Moreno told Montalvo that they "were 
just wasting time" and that they should "just get it over 
with and kill Avendano." Moreno then put Morillo's .357 
magnum to the back of Avendano's neck, making it clear 
that he was going to kill him. Shortly thereafter, Avendano 
was able to escape from the rear of the house. 
 
Avendano ran to a neighbor's house, where he frantically 
begged the neighbor in broken English to let him use the 
phone. Avendano called his wife in New Jersey, and his wife 
got on the phone with the neighbor and asked him to call 
the police because her husband was in danger. Mrs. 
Avendano also called the police in New Jersey. 
 
When the police arrived at the neighbor's house, 
Avendano related the story of his kidnapping to the police. 
Meanwhile, back in New Jersey, the police had also shown 
up at the Avendanos' apartment with the FBI. The 
Maryland police were able to corroborate Avendano's story 
with the police in New Jersey. The Maryland police put the 
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Maryland house under surveillance, secured a search 
warrant, and entered the house. All six defendants were 
arrested, and the police seized the .357 magnum with 
Moreno's fingerprints on it, Montalvo's pager, Montalvo's 
cell phone, a faxed photograph of Ochoa, and papers 
bearing the telephone numbers of Avendano's and Ochoa's 
beepers. 
 
All six defendants were indicted for: (1) kidnapping 
Avendano; (2) conspiring to kidnap Avendano and his wife; 
and (3) conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to 
distribute cocaine. All defendants except Quinones were 
indicted for kidnapping Mrs. Avendano. In addition, Moreno 
was indicted for using and carrying a firearm in relation to 
a crime of violence. 
 
The defendants were jointly tried by jury in the United 
States District Court for the District of New Jersey. At the 
conclusion of the government's case, Palma-Ruedas, Ortiz, 
and Moreno moved to dismiss the drug conspiracy charges 
against them pursuant to Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure.1 The district court granted their Rule 
29 motion, finding that the government had failed to prove 
that Palma-Ruedas, Ortiz, and Moreno had intended to join 
a cocaine distribution conspiracy. J.App. at 470. The jury 
found the defendants guilty of all remaining counts.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Rule 29(a) provides, in pertinent part: 
 
The court on motion of a defendant or of its own motion shall order 
the entry of judgment of acquittal of one or more offenses charged 
in the indictment or information after the evidence on either side is 
closed if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such 
offense or offenses. 
 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a). 
 
2. Montalvo was sentenced to life imprisonment on four counts to be 
served concurrently. Pacheco was sentenced to 292-months 
imprisonment on four counts to be served concurrently. Quinones was 
sentenced to 151-months imprisonment on three counts to be served 
concurrently. Palma-Ruedas was sentenced to 135-months 
imprisonment on three counts to be served concurrently. Ortiz was 
sentenced to 96-months imprisonment on three counts to be served 
concurrently. Moreno was sentenced to 87-months imprisonment on 
three counts to be served concurrently and 60-months imprisonment on 
the § 924(c)(1) count to be served consecutively. 
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All six defendants appealed, and we consolidated their 
appeals. The district court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
II. 
 
A. Venue 
 
Defendant Moreno was indicted and convicted of violating 
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). That section provides: 
 
Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of 
violence or drug trafficking crime . . . for which he may 
be prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or 
carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment 
provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking 
crime, be sentenced to imprisonment for five years 
. . . . 
 
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). 
 
At the conclusion of the government's case, Moreno 
moved to dismiss the § 924(c)(1) count for lack of venue. 
Moreno argued that because the evidence conclusively 
established that he had neither "used" nor "carried" the 
.357 magnum revolver outside of Maryland, venue could 
only properly lie in Maryland. The government conceded 
that Moreno had only used or carried the gun in Maryland 
but maintained that venue in New Jersey was proper 
nonetheless. According to the government, venue was 
proper in New Jersey for the gun charge because venue in 
New Jersey was proper for the predicate offense of 
kidnapping. 
 
Having no guidance from this Circuit on the venue issue, 
the district court was forced to choose between two 
opposing analyses offered, respectively, by the Ninth Circuit 
and the Fifth Circuit. Compare United States v. Corona, 34 
F.3d 876, 879 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that Nevada was 
improper venue for trying defendant on § 924(c)(1) charge, 
even though Nevada was proper venue for trying defendant 
on underlying drug conspiracy, when defendant never 
actually used or carried the firearm in Nevada), with United 
States v. Pomranz, 43 F.3d 156 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that 
defendant was properly tried for unlawful use of a firearm 
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during drug trafficking offense in any district in which 
venue was proper for underlying drug distribution 
conspiracy). Apparently persuaded by the Fifth Circuit's 
decision in Pomranz, the district court concluded that 
Moreno could properly be tried in New Jersey for violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). See J.App. at 468. 
 
Moreno's appeal requires us to address, for the first time, 
whether the Constitution requires a defendant to be tried 
under § 924(c)(1) in the venue where the violation of that 
statute took place. Or, to state the issue differently, can the 
government try a defendant for using or carrying a firearm 
in any venue where it may try the related crime when the 
defendant neither carried nor used the firearm in that 
venue? Because the district court's decision regarding 
proper venue was an interpretation of law, we have plenary 
review. United States v. Baxter, 884 F.2d 734, 735 (3d Cir. 
1989). 
 
Article III, Section II of the Constitution states in 
pertinent part: "The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of 
Impeachment, shall be . . . held in the State where the said 
crimes shall have been committed . . . ." U.S. Const. art. III, 
§ 2. Thus, by its explicit terms, the Constitution requires 
crimes to be tried where they are committed.3 
 
Moreover, we have emphasized that proper venue is not 
just a mere formal requirement but, rather, a right of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. This requirement is reinforced by the vicinage provision of the Sixth 
Amendment, which provides: 
 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed . . . . 
 
U.S. Const. amend VI. (emphasis added). See United States v. 
Anderson, 328 U.S. 699, 703 (1946). 
 
In addition, Rule 18 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
provides: 
 
Except as otherwise permitted by statute or by these rules, the 
prosecution shall be had in a district in which the offense was 
committed. 
 
Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 18 (emphasis added). 
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constitutional dimension. See United States v. Baxter, 884 
F.2d 734, 736 (3d Cir. 1989) ("[p]roper venue in criminal 
trials is more than just a procedural requirement; it is a 
safeguard guaranteed twice by the United States 
Constitution itself."); see also United States v. Goldberg, 
830 F.2d 459, 465 (3d Cir. 1987) ("The venue provisions of 
the Constitution are important safeguards, protecting an 
accused from unfairness and hardship in defending against 
prosecution by the federal government."). 
 
The government urges us to disregard these 
constitutional dictates and adopt the approach of the Fifth 
Circuit in Pomranz. Moreno urges us to adopt the approach 
of the Ninth Circuit in Corona. Because Corona and 
Pomranz elucidate the parameters of this issue, we will 
discuss those cases in some detail. 
 
In United States v. Corona, 34 F.3d 876, 879 (9th Cir. 
1994), the Ninth Circuit reversed the conviction of the 
appellant for the unlawful use of a firearm in violation of 
§ 924(c)(1) because of improper venue. Adopting a "key 
verbs" test, which examines the verbs in the statute that 
define the criminal conduct to determine where the offense 
was committed, the court held that Nevada was not the 
proper venue for the substantive crimes arising from the 
conspiracy -- distribution of cocaine and use of afirearm 
during drug trafficking -- which occurred entirely in 
California. Id. at 880. Because the defendant had not 
distributed cocaine nor used a firearm in Nevada, venue 
was improper, even though the conspiracy counts were 
properly tried in Nevada. 
 
In United States v. Pomranz, 43 F.3d 156 (5th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 116 S. Ct. 513 (1995), the Fifth Circuit explicitly 
rejected the Ninth Circuit's analysis. The Fifth Circuit noted 
that the Ninth Circuit's approach would "effectively 
undermine the Congressional intent to curb the violence 
inherently associated with high level drug deals." Pomranz, 
43 F.3d at 161. Because a violation of § 924(c)(1) is 
necessarily intertwined with the predicate act of drug 
trafficking or committing a violent crime, the Fifth Circuit 
concluded that § 924(c)(1) violations can be properly tried in 
the same venue as the underlying drug or violent crime 
offense. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied 
 
                                11 
heavily on policy concerns -- that the government would 
have to "expend its limited resources in prosecuting a felon 
a second time for this separate offense, or satisfy itself with 
the punishment previously imposed and forfeit a conviction 
on the weapons count." Id. at 161. Further, in addressing 
the obvious constitutional concerns inherent in its decision 
to allow venue, the court stated: "[W]e do not believe that 
our holding seriously infringes on the defendant's rights 
since this Court treats the right to venue with less 
deference than other constitutional rights." Id. at 162. 
 
Thus, while the Ninth Circuit, relying heavily on the 
literal language of the Constitution and Rule 18 of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, found the rights 
guaranteed by these provisions to outweigh concerns about 
judicial economy, the Fifth Circuit adopted a more 
pragmatic approach. The Ninth Circuit stated the tension 
between the two approaches this way: 
 
What the government is essentially arguing for is a rule 
of law allowing venue over a substantive crime 
committed in furtherance of a conspiracy in any 
district where venue is proper for the conspiracy 
charge. While such a rule might make some sense from 
a policy standpoint, it runs counter to the venue 
principles established by the Constitution, the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the federal courts. 
 
Corona, 34 F.3d at 879. 
 
Relying heavily on the rationale articulated in Pomranz, 
the government advances two arguments for finding venue 
proper in this case. First, the government urges us to 
consider the cost of forcing duplicative trials. Had the 
government been forced to try Moreno on the gun charge in 
Maryland, it contends, its resources would have been 
dramatically strained because it would have also had to 
retry Moreno on the underlying predicate offense of 
kidnapping. 
 
The government's second and related argument is that 
when determining venue, a court must look closely to "the 
nature" of § 924(c)(1). In other words, because a violation of 
§ 924(c)(1) is dependent on the predicate offense -- in this 
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case, kidnapping -- it would be illogical to require the 
§ 924(c)(1) offense to be tried in a different venue. 
 
We reject both of the government's arguments. Instead, 
we agree with the Ninth Circuit that to determine where 
venue should lie under § 924(c)(1) the "verb test" is the 
proper test.4 Applying that test here, we find that § 924(c)(1) 
unambiguously designates the criminal conduct that is 
prohibited as "using" or "carrying" afirearm. It follows that 
one "commits" a violation of § 924(c)(1) in the district where 
one "uses" or "carries" a firearm. Accordingly, we conclude 
that because the crime committed by Moreno -- carrying or 
using a firearm in relation to a crime of violence -- occurred 
only in Maryland, Moreno could only have been properly 
tried in Maryland. 
 
Contrary to the government's assertions, application of 
the verb test here would not cause it undue hardship. For 
example, our holding would not prevent the government 
from trying the predicate offense in any venue in which the 
§ 924(c)(1) charge would be properly brought. Indeed, had 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. For a discussion of the "verb test," see Armistead M. Dobie, Venue in 
Criminal Cases in the United States District Court, 12 Va. L. Rev. 287, 
289 (1926) ("All federal crimes are statutory, and these crimes are often 
defined . . . in terms of a single verb. That essential verb usually 
contains the key to the solution of the question: In what district was the 
crime committed?"). See generally United States v. Georgacarakos, 988 
F.2d 1289, 1293 (1st Cir. 1993) ("To determine venue, we examine `the 
key verbs in the statute defining the criminal offense' to find the scope 
of the relevant conduct.")(quoting United States v. Tedesco, 635 F.2d 
902, 905 (1st Cir. 1980)); United States v. Donahue, 885 F.2d 45, 49 (3d 
Cir. 1989) ("[I]t is often helpful to look at the statutory verb in the 
description of the offense in determining where an offense was 
committed."); United States v. Cofield, 11 F.3d 413, 416 (4th Cir. 1994) 
(noting that "we have adopted the `verb test' as an interpretative aid"); 
United States v. Murphy, ___ F.3d ___, 1997 WL 349887, at *2 (4th Cir. 
June 26, 1997) ("Where . . . Congress has not provided an express venue 
provision in conjunction with a criminal offense, this circuit has looked 
to the verbs defining the criminal offense and the purpose underlying the 
criminal statute to determine proper venue."); United States v. Crawford, 
___ F.3d ___, 1997 WL 339295, * 7 (8th Cir. June 23, 1997) (applying the 
"active verb" or "key verb" test to the Child Support Recovery Act); United 
States v. Ryan, 894 F.2d 355, 360 (10th Cir. 1990) ("Courts usually 
examine the verbs employed in the statute to define the offense."). 
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the government wanted to try Moreno on all counts in a 
single trial, it certainly could have done so in Maryland.5 
Thus, the government overstates the potential hardship it 
would face if forced to try § 924(c)(1) violations in the venue 
where the gun was used or carried. Essentially, the 
government wants to have the option of venue-- that is, it 
does not want to be restricted to trying these cases in the 
venue where the § 924 violation occurred. 
 
Many constitutional guarantees for criminal defendants 
are inefficient and costly -- the right to counsel comes to 
mind. Nevertheless, these guarantees form the bedrock 
principles of our criminal justice system and should not be 
hastily balanced away. See United States v. Johnson, 323 
U.S. 273, 276 (1944) ("If an enactment of Congress equally 
permits the underlying spirit of the constitutional concern 
for trial in the vicinage to be respected rather than to be 
disrespected, construction should go in the direction of 
constitutional policy . . . ."). Thus, here, where the statute 
does not indicate the location of the crime for purposes of 
determining venue, we must strictly construe the verbs that 
define the criminal conduct to ensure that the defendant's 
Sixth Amendment rights are protected.6  
 
While of course, Congress cannot abrogate the venue 
guarantee altogether, it can define a crime broadly such 
that commission of that crime will likely cross state 
borders. See Charles A. Wright, Federal Practice & 
Procedure § 302, at 201 (2d ed. 1982). For example, 18 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The government argues that the count charging Moreno with 
kidnapping Mrs. Avendano could only have properly been tried in New 
Jersey or New York, thus precluding a consolidated trial. Because 
Moreno's violation of § 924(c)(1) was only related to the kidnapping of Mr. 
Avendano, the fact that he committed a separate crime of kidnapping 
Mrs. Avendano is not particularly relevant to our venue analysis. 
 
6. The parade of horribles offered by the dissent to demonstrate the 
inadequacies of the "verb test," while perhaps compelling on its own 
terms, has no application in the context of this case. Although there may 
be statutes in which the verbs defining the criminal conduct are 
ambiguous, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) is not such a statute. Cf. United States 
v. Angotti, 105 F.3d 539, 542 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that the Corona 
court "quite logically" held that "the crime of distribution of narcotics is 
committed in the district where the narcotics are distributed"). 
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U.S.C. §§ 659 & 660 allow the government to indict an 
individual for "stealing" from interstate commerce in any 
district in which the individual "possessed" the proceeds of 
the theft. See id. Congress can also explicitly provide a 
venue provision for any given offense, as long as the venue 
bears some relation to the offense.7 But where, as here, 
Congress has not explicitly indicated an intention to allow 
multiple venue actions, we remain guided by the strict 
language of the Constitution. See Anderson, 328 U.S. at 
703 (holding that when "nothing in either the statute or the 
legislative history . . . show[s] an intention on the part of 
Congress to depart from the Sixth Amendment's command," 
courts must look to the nature of the crime and where it 
was committed to determine venue); United States v. 
Barsanti, 943 F.2d 428, 434 (4th Cir. 1991) ("Congress did 
not expressly provide for venue in 18 U.S.C. § 1001; 
therefore, we must look to the verbs of the statute for 
guidance."). 
 
In the specific context of § 924(c), Congress could have 
drafted the statute to allow venue to lie in any district 
where the government could properly bring the related 
crime of violence or drug trafficking offense. 8 Congress did 
not do so. Without such an explicit expression of 
congressional intent, we decline the government's invitation 
to construe liberally the venue requirement. 
 
Because Moreno only used or carried the gun in 
Maryland and because that conduct constitutes the 
substantive offense under § 924(c)(1), venue in New Jersey 
was improper. Accordingly, we reverse Moreno's conviction 
under § 924(c)(1) for lack of venue. 
 
B. Rule 404(b) Evidence 
 
Defendants Montalvo, Pacheco, and Quinones argue that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. For example, Congress has provided for continuing offenses to be tried 
"in any district in which such offense was begun, continued, or 
completed." 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a). And, murder offenses may be tried in 
any district "where the injury was inflicted . . . without regard to the 
place where the death occurs." 18 U.S.C. § 3236. 
 
8. Indeed, the dissent artfully suggests just how such a statute might be 
written. See Dissent at 33-34. 
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the district court abused its discretion in allowing the 
admission of "other crimes" evidence of previous drug 
transactions.9 Specifically, the defendants attack the 
admission of testimony from Avendano, the kidnapping 
victim, and Lopez, the drug courier, regarding the thwarted 
fourteen-kilo cocaine deal. Defendants also challenge the 
admission of Lopez's testimony about the five drug 
transactions that preceded the fourteen-kilo deal. According 
to defendants, they were prejudiced by the admission of 
this evidence in violation of Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules 
of Evidence, which prohibits the admission of prior bad 
acts when used to portray a defendant as a "bad person." 
Because the fourteen-kilo deal was admitted solely to 
portray the defendants as drug dealers and, thus,"bad 
people," defendants contend that it was improperly 
admitted. 
 
Initially, we must determine whether evidence of the prior 
cocaine transactions was probative of the charged conduct, 
rather than merely probative of the defendants' character. 
United States v. Sriyuth, 98 F.3d 739, 745 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 
Rule 404(b) provides: 
 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in order 
to show action in conformity therewith. It may, 
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as 
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident 
. . . . 
 
Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). 
 
Thus, for "other crimes" evidence to be admitted, it must 
be logically relevant, under Rules 404(b) and Rule 402, to 
any issue other than the defendant's propensity to commit 
the crime, and its probative value must outweigh its 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Evidence of the prior cocaine transactions was not admitted against 
Quinones at trial. His argument is better understood as objecting to the 
district court's refusal to sever his trial from the other defendants. In 
essence, Quinones claims that his trial should have been severed 
because evidence of the prior deals was admitted against his co- 
defendants. 
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prejudicial effect. United States v. Himelwright , 42 F.3d 
777, 781 (3d Cir. 1994). Because trial courts have 
substantial leeway in making evidentiary rulings, we review 
a district court's decision to admit 404(b) evidence for 
abuse of discretion. Id. When, however, a district court does 
not offer reasons for its evidentiary rulings, we need not 
defer to the reasoning of the district court. Id. 
 
1. The Fourteen-Kilo Deal. 
 
When the government first sought to introduce the 
fourteen-kilo cocaine deal, it offered it as part and parcel of 
the drug conspiracy count of the indictment. According to 
the government, the original fourteen-kilo deal was part of 
the charged drug conspiracy because all of the players were 
identical to the players in the thirty-kilo deal: Montalvo and 
Pacheco were the sellers; Avendano was the middleman; 
and Ochoa was the buyer. Under the government's theory, 
because the first fourteen-kilo deal was thwarted when the 
courier, Lopez, was arrested by police, Montalvo was eager 
to "up the ante" on the next deal. 
 
The district court, however, expressed unwillingness to 
consider the fourteen-kilo deal as part of the same 
conspiracy as the subsequent thirty-kilo deal because the 
indictment only charged a conspiracy to distribute thirty 
kilos of cocaine. Instead, the district court urged the 
government to introduce the fourteen-kilo deal as 404(b) 
evidence. 
 
Consequently, the government introduced the fourteen- 
kilo deal, offering the following reasons to explain why it 
qualified under Rule 404(b): 
 
[I]t provides the background and an explanation of the 
relationship between Mr. Montalvo, Mr. Pacheco, and 
Mr. Lopez . . . . There's an overlap in the 14 kilogram 
transaction because that overlaps to Mr. Ochoa, the 
guy who stole the 30 kilos in this case, and Avendano, 
who was intended middleman in the 14 and the 30. It 
also shows a method of operation. It also shows the 
planning and preparation in terms of having a car 
prepared to conceal these drugs. It's sort of a test run, 
so to speak, Your Honor, to take it for a distance from 
A to B, which is very short and then follow it up with 
 
                                17 
a matter of days and take it interstate from Houston 
towards New York. 
 
J.App. at 93-94. 
 
Presumably adopting the government's analysis, the 
district court admitted the prior drug deal: 
 
I don't have any difficulty with that whatsoever. The 
probative value of that is not substantially outweighed 
by the danger of any kind of unfair prejudice. I've ruled 
on that. Absolutely clear. Classic 404(b). 
 
J.App. at 94. 
 
We can infer that the district court adopted the 
government's proffered reason for admitting the fourteen- 
kilo deal as 404(b) evidence. See United States v. Sampson, 
980 F.2d 883, 888 (3d Cir. 1992) (stating that a district 
court's summary conclusion to admit 404(b) evidence may 
be sufficient if the government thoroughly explains its 
proffered reason for offering it). We agree that the 
government has sufficiently shown that the fourteen-kilo 
deal was a link in a chain of events that led to the charged 
conduct and not merely evidence that the defendants were 
more likely than not to have committed the charged 
conduct. Thus, we conclude that the district court properly 
determined that the fourteen-kilo cocaine deal qualified as 
"other crimes" evidence under Rule 404(b). 
 
Unfortunately, it is more difficult to decipher the 
reasoning of the district court with regard to the balancing 
analysis required by Rule 403.10 The district court merely 
stated a conclusion that the probative value of the evidence 
outweighed its prejudicial effect. Although the district court 
may have in fact engaged in Rule 403 balancing, it did not 
articulate on the record a rational explanation. See 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Rule 403 provides: 
 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations 
of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
 
Fed. R. Evid. 403. 
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Government of Virgin Islands v. Harris, 938 F.2d 401, 420 
(1991). Thus, we need not defer to the district court and 
can conduct the requisite balancing analysis ourselves. 
Himelwright, 42 F.3d at 781. 
 
In our view, while the fourteen-kilo deal may have had 
some prejudicial effect on Montalvo and Pacheco, the 
evidence of the deal was substantially relevant to the 
government's case against the defendants to outweigh any 
risk of prejudice. Indeed, the fourteen-kilo deal went to the 
heart of the government's theory of the case: The 
government contended that the thirty-kilo deal, which led 
to the kidnapping, was set up to offset the loss caused by 
the thwarted fourteen-kilo deal. 
 
In addition, the district court gave explicit limiting 
instructions to the jury immediately after Lopez's testimony, 
which described the fourteen-kilo deal.11  This limiting 
instruction mitigated any potential prejudice against 
Montalvo and Pacheco. See Sriyuth, 98 F.3d at 748 
(recognizing that unfair prejudice can be minimized by a 
limiting instruction). In other words, the limiting 
instruction sufficed to enable the jury to compartmentalize 
the evidence and consider it only for its proper purpose. Id. 
(citing United States v. Driggs, 823 F.2d 52, 54 (3d Cir. 
1987)). 
 
Thus, in our view, the evidence of the fourteen-kilo deal 
was highly probative to show method of operation and 
preparation, while the prejudicial effect was minimal. 
Accordingly, the fourteen-kilo deal was properly admitted as 
"other crimes" evidence under Rule 404(b). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Specifically, the court instructed the jury to: 
 
Use this evidence to decide whether or not defendant Montalvo and 
defendant Pacheco had knowledge of the drug conspiracy charged in 
the indictment and intended to participate in. Should you choose to 
believe the evidence of these other cocaine transactions you've heard 
this afternoon, I caution you, you may only use it for these limited 
purposes. You may not use it to prove that defendant Montalvo and 
defendant Pacheco are bad persons or that they were predisposed to 
do bad things. . . . 
 
J.App. at 281-82. 
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2. The Five Prior Drug Transactions. 
 
The defendants also object to the admission of five prior 
cocaine deals. The government offered evidence, through 
the testimony of Lopez, of five prior cocaine transactions 
purportedly to show Lopez's relationship with Montalvo and 
Pacheco. In addition, the government contended that 
Lopez's testimony about the prior deals was probative to 
rebut Montalvo's and Pacheco's claim of noninvolvement 
with Lopez. Lopez, however, had absolutely no involvement 
with the charged drug conspiracy -- that is, the thirty-kilo 
cocaine deal. The defendants therefore argue that the five 
prior deals did not relate to anything at issue in the case. 
 
Although it is clear that the district court found the 
evidence to be "classic 404(b)," it is unclear from the record 
whether the district court conducted a balancing analysis 
under Rule 403. J.App. at 94. The district court judge 
merely stated that: "[T]hat's other crimes evidence. I already 
told you, I balanced -- I balanced that last night, I certainly 
couldn't see the fourteen kilos as part of this transaction, 
but I think it's appropriate other crimes evidence." J.App. 
at 101. Moreover, the district court discussed the prior five 
deals as part and parcel of the fourteen-kilo deal, rather 
than as separate 404(b) evidence. Again, because the 
district court did not offer reasons for its ruling, we must 
engage in Rule 403 balancing as to the five prior deals 
ourselves. See Himelwright, 42 F.3d at 781. 
 
While the evidence of the five prior deals clearly shows a 
relationship between Montalvo and Pacheco, we question 
whether that evidence had much probative value because 
the relationship between Montalvo and Pacheco had already 
been established by the fourteen-kilo deal. On the other 
side of the scale, however, the risk of prejudice to the 
defendants by introducing that evidence was significant. 
Through its admission, the government may have been able 
effectively to convey to the jury that Montalvo and Pacheco 
were career drug dealers and "bad people." 
 
Nevertheless, we find it unlikely that "any prejudice 
resulting from the admission of [the 404(b) evidence] . . . 
`cause[d] the jury to base its decision on something other 
than the established propositions in this case.' " United 
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States v. McGlory, 968 F.2d 309, 339 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing 
Carter v. Hewitt, 617 F.2d 961, 972 (3d Cir. 1980)). In other 
words, given that the five prior deals were relatively small 
scale and that evidence of the fourteen-kilo deal had 
already been properly admitted, the admission of thefive 
prior deals likely had no effect on the jury's decision. 
Accordingly, while we are concerned with the district 
court's failure to explain its reasons for admitting the five 
prior cocaine deals, we do not think that the admission of 
that evidence rises to the level of reversible error. 
 
C. Severance 
 
Moreno, Palma-Ruedas, Ortiz, and Quinones contend 
that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to 
sever their trials from the trial of Montalvo and Pacheco. 
Specifically, Moreno, Palma-Ruedas, Ortiz and Quinones 
claim that the district court wrongly balanced the prejudice 
to the defendants against the advantages of joinder. 
 
In reviewing orders denying motions to sever, we look to 
the record as it existed when the motion was made, what 
trial developments were then reasonably foreseeable, and in 
that light decide whether the district court abused its 
discretion in denying the severance motion. United States v. 
Sandini, 888 F.2d 300, 305-06 (3d Cir. 1989); United States 
v. Console, 13 F.3d 641 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 
In general, we favor joint trials for defendants who are 
indicted together. See Zafiro v. United States , 506 U.S. 534, 
537 (1993); United States v. Balter, 91 F.3d 427, 432 (3d 
Cir. 1996). The defendants acknowledge this preference 
but, nevertheless, claim that evidence of the drug 
conspiracy admitted against Montalvo and Pacheco was so 
overwhelming that it "spilled over" to them. 
 
As the Supreme Court noted in Zafiro, courts should 
grant a severance motion "only if there is a serious risk that 
a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one 
of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a 
reliable judgment about guilt or innocence." Zafiro, 506 
U.S. at 538-39. Such a risk may occur "when evidence that 
the jury should not consider against a defendant and that 
would not be admissible if a defendant were tried alone is 
admitted against a codefendant." Id. at 539. According to 
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defendants, that is exactly what happened in this case. 
That is, Moreno, Palma-Ruedas, Ortiz, and Quinones 
contend that the jury could not possibly have 
compartmentalized the drug evidence admitted against 
Montalvo and Pacheco, even with explicit limiting 
instructions. 
 
When Moreno, Palma-Ruedas, Ortiz, and Quinones 
moved to sever, the district court had before it only an 
indictment charging all six defendants with conspiracy to 
kidnap and distribute drugs. Thus, when the motion was 
made, the district court had no reason to believe that 
Moreno, Palma-Ruedas, Ortiz, and Quinones were situated 
any differently with respect to the drug conspiracy than 
Montalvo and Pacheco. Moreno, Palma-Ruedas, Ortiz, and 
Quinones contend, however, that their severance argument 
is bolstered, retrospectively, by the fact that, at the 
conclusion of the government's case, the district court 
acquitted the defendants of the drug conspiracy charge 
pursuant to Rule 29. Yet, as the government properly 
points out, even if these defendants had been tried 
separately, evidence of the thirty-kilo drug deal would have 
been admissible against each of them to prove motive for 
the kidnapping charge. In other words, some evidence 
relating to a drug transaction -- indeed, the largest 
transaction -- was relevant to all of the charges and all of 
the defendants. Thus, we are unpersuaded by the 
defendants' contention that their trials were "tainted" by 
the association with drugs. 
 
Moreover, even if we were to find that the district court 
abused its discretion in denying the severance motion, the 
defendants must still pinpoint "clear and substantial 
prejudice," which resulted in an unfair trial. United States 
v. Eufrasio, 935 F.2d 553, 568 (3d Cir. 1991). We are 
convinced that by instructing the jury that evidence of the 
prior drug transactions -- specifically, evidence of the 
fourteen-kilo deal and the five smaller deals-- was to be 
considered only against Montalvo and Pacheco, the district 
court took sufficient steps to cure any prejudice caused by 
admission of that evidence. See Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 539 
(noting that "less drastic measures, such as limiting 
instructions, often will suffice to cure any risk of 
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prejudice"). Accordingly, we conclude that defendants have 
not shown clear or substantial prejudice as a result of the 
district court's denial of their severance motion. 
 
D. Variance 
 
Ortiz, Moreno, and Palma-Ruedas argue that their 
convictions should be vacated because there was a variance 
between the indictment and the proof at trial, to the 
prejudice of the their substantial rights. See Kotteakos v. 
United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946); United States v. 
Salmon, 944 F.2d 1106, 1116 (3d Cir. 1991) (noting that 
under Kotteakos, "a conviction must be vacated where a 
variance between the indictment and proof at trial exists to 
the prejudice of a defendant's substantial rights"). Ortiz, 
Moreno, and Palma-Ruedas contend, through a creative 
reading of the indictment, that the government actually 
charged one broad conspiracy but at trial presented proof 
of multiple conspiracies. Specifically, they contend that 
there was a variance between the indictment and the proof 
offered at trial because they were charged with a cocaine 
conspiracy but convicted of a kidnapping conspiracy. We 
reject this argument. 
 
The second superseding indictment charged Ortiz, 
Moreno, and Palma-Ruedas with conspiracy to distribute 
cocaine and conspiracy to kidnap. J.App. at 20. At trial, the 
existence of those two conspiracies was proven. While true 
that Ortiz, Moreno, and Palma-Ruedas were convicted only 
of the kidnapping conspiracy, the fact that they were 
acquitted of one of the conspiracies does not establish a 
prejudicial variance. On the contrary, the defendants were 
indicted on a kidnapping conspiracy and convicted on a 
kidnapping conspiracy; thus, there is no variance here. 
 
E. Sufficiency of Evidence to Convict Quinones 
 
Quinones argues that his convictions should be reversed 
because the evidence against him was insufficient to 
support a guilty verdict. Specifically, he argues that the 
government failed to show that he had knowledge of the 
objectives of the drug and kidnapping conspiracies or that 
he willingly entered into such conspiracies. 
 
In determining whether to sustain a conviction, we view 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the government 
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and determine whether a trier of fact could have found each 
element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 
United States v. Schramm, 75 F.3d 156, 159 (3d Cir. 1996). 
In short, we "will reverse for insufficient evidence only 
where the failure of the prosecution is clear." Government of 
the Virgin Islands v. Isaac, 50 F.3d 1175, 1179 (3d Cir. 
1995). 
 
On a conspiracy charge, the government need not prove 
conspiratorial intent through direct evidence. Rather, the 
government can rely "entirely on circumstantial evidence to 
prove that an alleged conspirator had the knowledge and 
intent necessary to commit the crime." United States v. 
Carr, 25 F.3d 1194, 1201 (3d Cir. 1994). Here, the 
government presented testimony that Quinones was 
present at the initial meeting in November of 1994 between 
Avendano and Montalvo, in which they discussed 
negotiating a possible deal with Ochoa. The government 
also showed that Quinones travelled with all of the 
kidnappers and Avendano from Quinones's house in New 
York to Maryland. Moreover, it was established that 
Quinones was present when Moreno threatened Avendano 
with the .357 magnum and that Quinones made an attempt 
to escape when the police entered the Maryland house. 
 
From all of these circumstantial facts, a reasonable juror 
could infer that Quinones knowingly and intentionally 
participated in the drug and kidnapping conspiracies. 
Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to 
support Quinones's conviction on all counts. 
 
F. Speedy Trial Act 
 
Moreno filed a supplemental pro se brief alleging that the 
government violated his right under the Speedy Trial Act to 
be charged by indictment within thirty days after being 
arrested or served with a complaint. 
 
The Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b), requires that: 
 
Any information or indictment charging an individual 
with the commission of an offense shall be filed within 
thirty days from the date on which such individual was 
arrested or served with a summons in connection with 
such charges. 
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Moreno contends that his conviction on the § 924 count 
should be reversed because the government did not indict 
him on this count within thirty days of his initial arrest. As 
the government properly points out, however, Moreno was 
not charged upon arrest with violating § 924. Rather, he 
was initially charged on that count through a formal, 
superseding indictment. Section 3161(b) plainly states that 
it only applies if the arrest was made "in connection with 
such charges." Because Moreno had already been arrested 
on charges stemming from the first indictment, there was 
no arrest in connection with the § 924(c)(1) charge. 
Accordingly, the thirty-day time limit does not apply. See 
United States v. Beal, 940 F.2d 1159, 1162 (8th Cir. 1991). 
 
Moreover, Moreno failed to move for dismissal of the 
indictment prior to trial. Section 3162(a)(2) of the Speedy 
Trial Act clearly states: "Failure of the defendant to move 
for dismissal prior to trial or entry of a plea of guilty or nolo 
contendere shall constitute a waiver of the right to 
dismissal under this section." 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2). See 
also United States v. Patten, 826 F.2d 198, 199 (2d Cir. 
1987) (per curiam) (rights under Act waived when 
defendant did not request dismissal until after jury 
selection began); United States v. Jernigan, 20 F.3d 621, 
622 n.2 (5th Cir. 1994) (rights under Act waived when 
defendant did not move for dismissal prior to trial). 
Accordingly, we reject Moreno's Speedy Trial Act claim. 
 
G. Suppression 
 
Montalvo, Pacheco, Quinones, Moreno, and Palma- 
Ruedas claim that the district court erred by failing to 
suppress the evidence seized at the Maryland residence. 
Specifically, the defendants contend that there was 
insufficient probable cause to support a search warrant. 
 
Defendants' claim is without merit. When the police came 
to the house in Maryland, they were able to corroborate Mr. 
Avendano's story through the police in New Jersey. Thus, 
the magistrate clearly "had a `substantial basis for . . . 
concluding' that a search would uncover evidence of 
wrongdoing." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983) 
(quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960)). 
Accordingly, there was sufficient probable cause to support 
a search warrant. 
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Moreover, even if the warrant was not supported by 
sufficient probable cause, suppression would be 
inappropriate because the police reasonably relied on the 
warrant. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920-22 
(1984); United States v. Williams, 3 F.3d 69, 74 (3d Cir. 
1993). Accordingly, the district court properly admitted the 
evidence seized from the Maryland house. 
 
H. Admission of Hearsay Testimony 
 
When the defendants were at the house of Quinones in 
New York, a police detective came to the door to check on 
a suspicious car in the driveway. Rosemary Alvarez, 
Quinones's wife, answered the door with Montalvo. At trial, 
the police detective testified that Alvarez told him that 
Montalvo was "Carlos Torres." 
 
Montalvo objects to the admission of the detective's 
testimony, claiming that it was inadmissible hearsay. 
Whether evidence is hearsay is a question of law subject to 
plenary review. United States v. Sallins, 993 F.2d 344, 346 
(3d Cir. 1993). 
 
We agree with the district court that the detective's 
testimony was not hearsay. The testimony was not 
introduced to prove that Montalvo really was "Carlos 
Torres" -- i.e., it was not admitted to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). Rather, the 
testimony was offered to show consciousness of guilt and to 
show that the statement was, in fact, false. See United 
States v. Levy, 865 F.2d 551, 558 (3d Cir. 1989) (in banc) 
(noting that "defendants' attempt to conceal their true 
identities by providing aliases to the police upon arrest is 
relevant as consciousness of guilt"); Anderson v. United 
States, 417 U.S. 211, 219-20 (1974) (holding that 
statements were not hearsay when admitted "to establish a 
foundation for later showing, through other admissible 
evidence, that they were false") (citations omitted). 
 
Even though Montalvo did not offer the information 
himself, he allowed Alvarez to offer the false statement 
without correcting her. The statement was thus probative 
regarding consciousness of guilt because the jury could 
have reasonably inferred that Montalvo welcomed Alvarez's 
misidentification of him. J.App. at 313. Further, we agree 
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with the district court that the admission of the statement 
was not prejudicial. Thus, we conclude that the district 
court properly admitted the testimony of the detective. 
 
I. Evidence of Montalvo's Past Name 
 
Montalvo argues that the district court abused its 
discretion when it allowed the government to ask 
Montalvo's former mother-in-law on cross-examination 
whether she had ever known Montalvo by any other name. 
On direct examination, Montalvo's mother-in-law repeatedly 
referred to Montalvo as "Omar." On cross, the prosecutor 
asked whether she had ever known Montalvo by any other 
name. She replied that she had known him as "Rubin 
Tascon" and that, in fact, "Rubin Tascon" was the name 
that appeared on her daughter's marriage certificate. 
 
The trial court enjoys "sound discretion" in determining 
the scope of cross-examination. United States v. Werme, 
939 F.2d 108, 117 (3d Cir. 1991). Here, the district court, 
after considering Montalvo's objection, determined that the 
prosecutor could elicit testimony tending to prove that 
Montalvo's mother-in-law did not normally refer to him as 
Omar. The testimony was probative because it tended to 
support the inference that Montalvo knew he was breaking 
the law and was trying to hide behind an alias. See Levy, 
865 F.2d at 558. In addition, we agree with the district 
court's determination that the witness's reference to 
Montalvo's "real name" -- Rubin Tascon -- was not unduly 
prejudicial. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in allowing the government to make this point on 
cross-examination. 
 
J. Government's Reference in Closing to Montalvo's 
Past Names 
 
Montalvo claims that he was denied a fair trial because 
the government referred, in closing, to Montalvo's past 
names. Because Montalvo made no objection to the 
prosecutor's closing at trial, he is required to show plain 
error. United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 249 (3d 
Cir. 1996); see also United States v. Price, 76 F.3d 526, 530 
(3d Cir. 1996) (defining plain error as " `egregious error or 
a manifest miscarriage of justice' "). We conclude that 
Montalvo cannot show plain error as required. 
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In closing, the government referred to "Carlos Torres" and 
"Rubin Tascon" as names previously used by Montalvo. Yet, 
as discussed in the previous section, both of these past 
names had already been submitted to the jury through the 
testimony of witnesses. Because we have concluded that 
the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting 
evidence of Montalvo's aliases through the testimony of 
witnesses, we can hardly conclude that the government's 
reference to these names in closing rose to the level of plain 
error. 
 
K. Exclusion of Hearsay Testimony of Marilyn 
Hernandez 
 
Quinones argues that the district court committed 
reversible error when it refused to admit the testimony of 
Marilyn Hernandez regarding the meeting between 
Avendano, Montalvo, and Quinones. The defense attempted 
to admit Hernandez's statement that when Montalvo 
introduced Avendano to Quinones at Quinones's house on 
January 1, 1995, Quinones said, "Nice to meet you." 
Quinones's theory was that this statement tended to rebut 
Avendano's contention that Quinones was at the initial 
meeting with Montalvo and Avendano in November 1994, 
and that the statement showed that Quinones did not know 
that Avendano was being held against his will. 
 
The district court excluded the testimony as hearsay. 
Quinones argues that the statement was not hearsay 
because it was not being offered to prove the truth of the 
statement. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). In the alternative, he 
argues that even if the statement was hearsay, it was 
admissible under Rule 803(3), which allows the admission 
of statements of the declarant's then existing state of mind. 
See Fed. R. Evid. 803(3). Thus, the first question is whether 
or not the statements regarding the meeting between 
Quinones and Avendano were offered to prove the matter 
asserted -- i.e., that Quinones and Avendano had never 
met before January 1, 1995. 
 
The district court found that the statements were offered 
precisely to prove the truth of the matter asserted-- that 
is, that Quinones and Avendano did not know each other. 
Quinones makes a hypertechnical, syntactic argument by 
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asserting that the relevance of the statement was not that 
Quinones really thought that "it was nice" to meet 
Avendano but, rather, merely that the statements were 
said. Quinones's counsel, however, undermined this 
argument in closing when he asserted that Quinones could 
not have been at the November 1994 meeting "because they 
never met before January 1, 1995." J.App. at 559; see 
United States v. Sallins, 993 F.2d 344, 347 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(noting that defense counsel's use of the statement for its 
truth in closing argument confirms that the statement was 
inadmissible hearsay). While Quinones may not have 
offered the statement for its express meaning, he did offer 
it for the implied assertion that he had never met 
Avendano. Statements offered to support an implied 
assertion are inadmissible hearsay. See United States v. 
Reynolds, 715 F.2d 99, 104 (3d Cir. 1983). 
 
Nor are we convinced by Quinones's argument that the 
statement fell within Rule 803(3)'s exception to the hearsay 
rule. Statements admitted to show state of mind under 
Rule 803(3) "cannot be offered to prove the truth of the 
underlying facts asserted." Stelwagon Mfg. Co. v. Tarmac 
Roofing Sys., Inc., 63 F.3d 1267, 1274 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 
Moreover, even if the statement was admissible, its 
omission did not constitute prejudicial error. The district 
court allowed the inference that the defense hoped to get 
across by allowing Hernandez to testify that in her opinion 
Quinones and Avendano were meeting for the first time. 
J.App. at 396. Further, as noted earlier, defense counsel 
was able to refer to the excluded statement in closing. 
J.App. at 542, 551, 558-59. Thus, because defense counsel 
was able to get the point across to the jury anyway, the 
district court's ruling, if error, was harmless. 
 
L. District Court's Comments on Defense Witness 
Testimony 
 
Quinones further argues that the district court's 
response to the testimony of Marilyn Hernandez served to 
undermine her credibility and unfairly prejudice Quinones. 
As such, Quinones claims that the district court's failure to 
remain neutral and detached constitutes plain error. We 
are unpersuaded. 
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When reviewing for plain error, we look for errors that 
"undermine the fundamental fairness of the trial and 
contribute to a miscarriage of justice." United States v. 
Price, 13 F.3d 711, 724 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting United 
States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 16 (1985)). In response to 
defense counsel's repeated attempts to elicit hearsay 
testimony from Hernandez, the judge commented out of 
frustration: "This is so bizarre." In our view, this statement 
is nothing more than a benign reflection of the judge's 
reaction to defense counsel's persistence. See United States 
v. Beaty, 722 F.2d 1090 (3d Cir. 1983) (upholding 
defendant's conviction when judge's actions reflected 
"frustrat[ion] by counsel's repeated attempts to do that 
which he had properly been forbidden to do"). In any event, 
the judge immediately apologized to the jury, see J.App. at 
397, and later instructed the jury to disregard any 
comments that she may have made with regard to witness 
testimony, reminding them that they were "the sole judges 
of the credibility of the witnesses." Supp. App. at 192, 196- 
97. Thus, we conclude that the judge's actions did not 
"reach the point where it appear[ed] to the jury that the 
court believe[d] the accused [was] guilty." Price, 13 F.3d at 
723. Accordingly, we find no plain error. 
 
M. Guard's Remark Regarding Defendant's 
Incarceration 
 
Finally, Palma-Ruedas argues that a court guard 
impermissibly conveyed to the jury that he was 
incarcerated, in violation of his due process right to a fair 
trial. See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503-05 (1976) 
(Fourteenth Amendment rights of defendant violated when 
compelled to stand trial before jury while dressed in 
identifiable prison clothes). We find that the guard's remark 
here falls far short of the due process violation discussed in 
Estelle. 
 
On the seventh day of the trial, Palma-Ruedas's lawyer 
told the district court that in the morning, as she was 
coming into the courthouse with two jurors, a court 
security officer told them: "You can't go down yet, your 
packages are not here." One juror responded, "What 
packages?" The officer responded, "The packages, if you 
catch my meaning." 
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Palma-Ruedas claims that the guard's random remark 
tainted the jurors and, accordingly, that his convictions 
should be reversed. At trial, Palma-Ruedas noted to the 
district court only that he "wanted to put it on the record" 
and asked for no specific relief. In other words, Palma- 
Ruedas did not ask for a mistrial, nor did he ask the court 
to look into the matter further. Palma-Ruedas's failure to 
seek relief is telling because it tends to show that, at the 
time, Palma-Ruedas did not think the guard's remarks were 
particularly damaging to his fair trial rights. See United 
States v. Colletti, 984 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1992) (noting that 
defendant's failure to ask for correction at trial supports the 
"inference that . . . the incident was not nearly as 
significant as the present argument would suggest"). 
 
In any event, we are not convinced that the guard's 
remark was unduly prejudicial. Indeed, we find it unlikely 
that the jurors even had any idea what the guard was 
talking about; jurors are not usually well-versed in the 
jargon of courthouse guards. Moreover, even assuming the 
jurors understood the guard's oblique reference, in our 
view, this random remark to two jurors is insufficient to 
constitute a violation of Palma-Ruedas's due process rights 
to a fair trial. See United States v. Villabona-Garnica, 63 
F.3d 1051, 1058 (11th Cir. 1995) (distinguishing Estelle 
where the prison clothing was a "constant reminder" to the 
jury that the defendant was incarcerated, from defendant's 
remark on cross-examination that he was incarcerated). 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse Defendant Moreno's 
§ 924(c)(1) conviction for improper venue. We affirm the 
defendants' convictions in all other respects. 
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ALITO, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part: 
 
I join the opinion of the court except insofar as it reverses 
Moreno's conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) on the 
ground that venue in the District of New Jersey was 
constitutionally impermissible. The majority reaches this 
result based on the so-called "verb test." Applying this test, 
the majority holds that a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) 
may be prosecuted only where the defendant used or 
carried the firearm and not where the defendant committed 
the underlying crime of violence or drug trafficking crime. 
Accord United States v. Corona, 34 F.3d 876, 879 (9th Cir. 
1994).1 
 
I disagree with this analysis and conclusion. Instead of 
relying solely on the "verb test," I think that we should 
inquire where, in substance, the offense was "committed." 
United States Constitution, Art. III, sec. 2, cl. 3 & Amend. 
VI. In other words, we should make a realistic appraisal of 
the "nature of the crime" defined by the statute. Cf. United 
States v. Anderson, 328 U.S. 699, 703 (1946). When the 
offense created by 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) is examined in this 
way, it is apparent that the commission of the crime of 
violence or drug-trafficking crime is a critical element of the 
offense and that permitting venue in a district in which the 
commission of this underlying crime occurred is consistent 
with the Constitution's venue provisions.2  Accord United 
States v. Pomranz, 43 F.3d 156, 161-62 (5th Cir. 1995);3 
United States v. Friedman, 1996 WL 612456, *6 (E.D.N.Y.). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Although the majority interprets the Constitution's venue provisions 
as embodying the "verb test," the majority seems to suggest (a) that 
Congress can bypass the verb test by specifying venue itself and (b) that 
this congressionally specified venue will pass constitutional muster "as 
long as the venue bears some relation to the offense." (Maj. Op. at 14- 
15)(footnote omitted). But if the majority is correct that the verb test is 
constitutionally mandated, how can Congress bypass it and specify 
venue in any place that merely "bears some relation to the offense"? 
 
2. For convenience, I refer to Article III, section 2, clause 3 of the 
Constitution and the relevant provision of the Sixth Amendment as the 
Constitution's venue provisions. See footnote 6, infra. 
 
3. Although I agree with the holding in Pomranz, I do not endorse all of 
the reasoning in that opinion. Specifically, I do not think that the 
prosecution's convenience or inconvenience per se (see 43 F.3d at 161 
n.8) is a relevant factor in ascertaining the scope of the Constitution's 
venue provisions. 
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I. 
 
The criminal statute at issue here provides, in pertinent 
part, as follows: 
 
Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence 
or drug trafficking crime . . . for which he may be 
prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or 
carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment 
provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking 
crime, be sentenced to imprisonment for five years. 
. . .[4] 
 
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (emphasis added). "[U]ses" and 
"carries" are verbs. "[D]uring and in relation to any crime of 
violence or drug trafficking crime" is a prepositional phrase. 
Under the majority's "verb test," venue is proper in only 
those districts in which occurred actions denoted in the 
relevant criminal statute by verbs. Accordingly, in this case, 
the majority concludes, the "verb test" restricts venue to the 
District of Maryland, where Moreno carried a firearm, and 
precludes venue in those other districts, including the 
District of New Jersey, through which the crime of violence, 
kidnapping, moved. 
 
The verb test thus makes syntax constitutionally 
determinative. Consider the result that would follow if 18 
U.S.C. § 924(c) were rephrased slightly as follows: 
 
Whoever during and in relation to commits any crime 
of violence or drug trafficking crime . . . for which he 
may be prosecuted in a court of the United States and 
during and in relation to that crime uses or carries 
a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment 
provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking 
crime, be sentenced to imprisonment for five years. 
 
This version is wordier than the original, but its meaning is 
the same. However, because of the addition of the verb 
"commits," the "verb test" would presumably permit venue 
in any district in which the crime of violence or drug 
trafficking crime was committed. I cannot believe that the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The statute goes on to prescribe sentences of 10 or 30 years for cases 
involving certain types of firearms. Id. 
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meaning of the constitutional restrictions on venue turns 
on such syntactical trifles. 
 
The apparent author of the "verb test," Judge Armistead 
M. Dobie of the Fourth Circuit, does not seem to have 
claimed any such office for his creation. In the article 
usually cited as the source of the test, Judge Dobie wrote: 
 
All federal crimes are statutory, and these crimes are 
often defined, hidden away amid pompous verbosity, in 
terms of a single verb. That essential verb usually 
contains the key to the solution of the question: in 
what district was the crime committed. Without the 
exact language of the statute, particularly this verb, 
paraphrases and loose citations in this field, are more 
than inaccurate, they are positively misleading. When, 
as is so often the case, the statute enumerates several 
such verbs, only scrupulous, even meticulous, nicety 
in exact quotation can prevent these statutes, as well 
as the decisions under them, from proving a snare and 
delusion to the unwary. 
 
Armistead M. Dobie, Venue in Criminal Cases in the United 
States District Court, 12 Va. L. Rev. 287, 289 (1926) 
(emphasis added); see also United States v. Walden, 464 
F.2d 1015, 1018 (4th Cir. 1972). As the quoted language 
demonstrates, Judge Dobie did not suggest that the verb 
test was "the proper" or "only" method to determine venue. 
He merely suggested that the verb test was "usually" the 
best method to determine venue. Cf. Norman Abrams, 
Conspiracy and Multi-Venue in Federal Criminal 
Prosecutions: The Crime Committed Formula, 9 UCLA L. Rev. 
751, 777 (1962) (verb test, although important,"constitutes 
only the first step" in determining venue). 
 
II. 
 
Article III, section 2, clause 3 of the Constitution provides 
that "[t]he trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of 
Impeachment . . . shall be held in the State where the said 
crimes shall have been committed" (emphasis added).5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 18 echoes this command, 
providing that the "prosecution shall be had in a district in which the 
offense was committed." 
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Similarly, the Sixth Amendment states that "[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and 
district wherein the crime shall have been committed" 
(emphasis added).6 Is an offense "committed," for 
constitutional purposes, in only those places in which 
actions denoted by verbs occurred? Perhaps this is obvious 
to the majority, but it is not apparent to me. Thus, the 
constitutional text, by itself, does not seem to me to provide 
a sufficient basis for adopting the verb test. 
 
Nor am I aware of other evidence that these 
constitutional provisions were meant to embody the verb 
test, i.e., to force Congress to think about its use of 
grammar in formulating criminal statutes. On the contrary, 
the origin of these constitutional provisions shows that they 
were adopted to achieve important substantive ends-- 
primarily, to deter governmental abuses of power. Cf. 
United States v. Johnston, 323 U.S. 273, 276 (1944) 
("Questions of venue in criminal cases . . . are not merely 
matters of formal legal procedure. They raise deep issues of 
public policy . . . ."). 
 
"As the difficulties between the American colonies and 
Great Britain increased during the period immediately prior 
to the American Revolution, those in authority who 
represented the royal interests became concerned that royal 
interests could not be adequately protected in American 
courts, particularly when American colonists were charged 
with crimes." Drew L. Kershen, Vicinage 29 Okla. L. Rev. 
803, 805 (1976). In 1769, despite warnings that such a 
measure might lead to war, Parliament revived an ancient 
statute under which American colonists accused of treason 
could be taken to England or another colony for trial. See 
William Wirt Blume, The Place of Trial of Criminal Cases: 
Constitutional Vicinage and Venue, 43 Mich. L. Rev. 59, 63- 
64 (1944); Kershen, supra, 29 Okla. L. Rev. at 805-06. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Strictly speaking, Article III, section 2, clause 3 concerns venue (where 
the trial occurs), whereas the Sixth Amendment concerns vicinage (where 
the jury is drawn). It has been said, however, that"[t]his technical 
distinction is of no importance." Charles A. Wright, 2 Federal Practice & 
Procedure (Criminal), § 301 at 190 (1982 & 1996 Supp.). 
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During the next few years, Parliament enacted similar laws 
applicable to persons charged with offenses such as 
destroying dock yards, magazines, ships, ammunition, or 
supplies. Blume, supra, 43 Mich. L. Rev. at 63; Kershen, 
supra, 29 Okla. L. Rev. at 806-07. Resentment against 
these measures was so deep that the Declaration of 
Independence denounced King George III "[f]or transporting 
us beyond Seas to be tried for pretended offenses." This 
practice has been described as one of the precipitating 
factors of the American Revolution. See, e.g., Blume, supra, 
43 Mich. L. Rev. at 63-67. 
 
After the Boston Massacre, Parliament also passed a law, 
14 Geo. III, c.39 (1774), designed to protect British soldiers 
who were charged in Massachusetts with capital offenses 
based on actions taken in suppressing riots or enforcing 
the revenue laws. Kershen, supra, 29 Okla. L. Rev. at 807. 
If it appeared to the governor that "an indifferent trial" 
could not be held in Massachusetts, the accused could be 
tried in England or another colony. Id. "This circumvention 
of the judgment of the victimized community was attacked 
as a `Mock Trial' system in the Declaration of 
Independence." Akhil Reed Amar, The Constitution and 
Criminal Procedure -- First Principles 243 n.163 (1997).7 
 
Following independence, several states adopted 
constitutional provisions limiting a criminal prosecution to 
the place where the crime was "committed"8 or where the 
"facts" "ar[o]se"9 or "happen[ed].10 And a few years later, 
similar safeguards were placed in Article III, section 2, and 
the Sixth Amendment.11 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The Declaration of Independence charged the king with "protecting 
[troops], by a mock trial, from Punishment for any Murders which they 
should commit on the Inhabitants of these States." 
 
8. N.H. Const. of 1784, art. I, § 17. 
 
9. Md. Const. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. 18. 
 
10. Mass. Const. of 1780, Part first, art. 13. 
 
11. At the Federal Constitutional Convention, several proposals were 
introduced to restrict venue to the state where the offense was 
"committed." See Francis Heller, The Sixth Amendment 22-24 (1951). 
These proposals engendered little debate, none of which seems to have 
focused on precisely what was meant by the place where an offense was 
"committed." Id. Likewise, debate on the Sixth Amendment did not 
elucidate this question. For a summary of this debate, see Kershen, 
supra, 29 Okla. L. Rev. at 817-28. 
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Justice Story explained the purpose of these provisions 
as follows: 
 
The object . . . is to secure the party accused from 
being dragged to a trial in some distant state, away 
from his friends, and witnesses, and neighbourhood; 
and thus subjected to the verdict of mere strangers, 
who may feel no common sympathy, or who may even 
cherish animosities, or prejudices against him. Besides 
this; a trial in a distant state or territory might subject 
the party to the most oppressive expenses, or perhaps 
even to the inability of procuring the proper witnesses 
to establish his innocence. 
 
Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution § 925 
(Carolina Academic Press reprint 1987). Recent scholarship 
has suggested another possible purpose: to protect a 
community's right to have trials of local offenses occur in 
the community. See Amar, supra, 124 & n.163. 
 
Against this background, I reject the suggestion that the 
meaning of the constitutional venue provisions is to be 
determined by diagramming the language of the relevant 
criminal statute. Would the framers have thought that 
prosecuting an American colonist in England on a charge of 
treason was permissible if Parliament had been able to craft 
a treason statute in which a verb denoted an action 
occurring in England? The answer is no. The constitutional 
venue provisions were meant to put in place important 
substantive protections against government abuse.12 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. It is crucial to understand that the venue protection is, at its heart, 
a protection or check against a government seeking to overreach the 
power granted to it by the people. A government (whether the English 
Parliament or some modern-day Congress) consciously seeking to 
overreach its powers and checked only by the verb test could bypass the 
venue protections of Article III and the Sixth Amendment by carefully 
placing verbs in its criminal statutes that would define the criminal acts 
of a defendant in terms of their effect on entities or persons in regions 
where prosecution would be easy for the government. 
 
My point is simple. The verb test may be a usefulfirst cut at 
determining venue. But as recent cases have demonstrated, verbs (and 
hence the verb test) can be stretched broadly. Cf. United States v. 
Angotti, 105 F.3d 539, 542-55 (majority) & 547 (Norris, J., dissenting) 
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III. 
 
The Supreme Court has never embraced the "verb test." 
Rather, the Court has instructed that venue must be 
determined by looking to "the nature of the crime" and the 
"location of the act or acts constituting it." United States v. 
Anderson, 328 U.S. 699, 703 (1946). See also Travis v. 
United States, 364 U.S. 631, 635 (1961); United States v. 
Cores, 356 U.S. 405, 408 (1958). Nor, as far as I can tell, 
has any court of appeals held that the "verb test" is the 
only proper test for determining where venue is 
constitutionally permitted. Most of the cases suggest that, 
while the "verb test" may provide a usefulfirst cut at 
determining venue, there are complicated crimes for which 
a rigid grammar-based test may not be appropriate. See, 
e.g., United States v. Cofield, 11 F.3d 413, 417 (4th Cir. 
1994) (examination of the verbs in a statute is not the 
exclusive method of determining venue; "there are crimes 
where the situs is not so simple of definition") (quoting 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
(9th Cir. 1997) (in evaluating venue under a statute that made it 
criminal to "knowingly make" certain false statements for the "purpose of 
influencing" the actions of a federally insured institution, the court held 
that a statement was "made" not only where it was physically submitted 
to the local financial institution (an intermediary), but also at the point 
where it was received by the institution or persons whom it ultimately 
influenced); cf. also United States v. Crawford, 1997 WL 339295, *7-8, 
115 F.3d 1397, __ (8th Cir. 1997) (in determining venue under a statute 
criminalizing the "failure to make" child support payments to a child who 
"resides" in another state, court held that the "failure to make" the 
payments occurred not only in the states where the defendant was and 
where the court order was imposed, but also where the child resided); 
United States v. Murphy, 1997 WL 349887, *3, __ F.3d __, __ (4th Cir. 
1997) (same conclusion as Crawford, but in reaching its outcome court 
focussed on the verb "resides," even though"resides" refers to the child 
and not the defendant). (I cite these cases, not to express agreement or 
disagreement with their holdings, but as illustrations of the malleability 
of the "verb test.") If we limit ourselves to the protection of the verb test, 
we, in effect, eliminate our protection against a government that wants 
to overreach its power and is willing to carefully structure its use of 
grammar in criminal statutes to achieve that goal. It was an 
overreaching government that the venue protection was geared towards, 
not a government that was not careful enough with its use of grammar. 
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United States v. Billups, 692 F.2d 320, 332 (4th Cir. 1982)); 
United States v. Newsom, 9 F.3d 337, 339 (4th Cir. 1993) 
("the verbs examination method is not exclusive") (quotation 
omitted); United States v. Beddow, 957 F.2d 1330, 1335 
(6th Cir. 1992) (employing a "substantial contacts" test for 
determining venue); United States v. Beech-Nut Nutrition 
Corp., 871 F.2d 1181, 1188-89 (2d Cir. 1989) (same); 
United States v. Tedesco, 635 F.2d 902, 905 (1st Cir. 1980) 
(verb test is "[o]ne" method of determining venue). Indeed, 
even the Ninth Circuit, whose analysis and conclusion in 
Corona the majority follows, has explicitly disavowed a 
reading of Corona that would suggest that the verb test was 
"the" interpretive tool to be used in determining venue. See 
Angotti, 105 F.3d at 544 (leaving open the question whether 
"focus on key verbs should be the exclusive measure of 
venue"). 
 
IV. 
 
Showing that rigid application of the "verb test" is wrong 
is simpler than setting out an alternative "test" that works 
in all cases, and I will not attempt to do the latter here. For 
present purposes, it is enough to show that in a 
prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) the commission of 
the crime of violence or drug trafficking crime is a 
sufficiently important element to permit venue in any 
district in which the defendant engages in that conduct. 
 
It is apparent from the text of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) that 
the defendant's commission of the underlying crime of 
violence or drug trafficking offense forms a vital part of the 
evil that Congress sought to punish and prevent.13 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. This element involves conduct that is in itself wrongful; as the 
District of Columbia Circuit has observed, this element is not simply a 
jurisdictional " `hook' on which to hang a federalized prohibition against 
the use and carrying of firearms." United States v. Anderson, 59 F.3d 
1323, 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (in banc); cf. Peter W. Low and Joseph L. 
Hoffman, Federal Criminal Law 6 (1997) ("Nothing has so distorted 
federal criminal law as the habit of defining federal crimes in such a way 
as to make jurisdictional requirements appear to be penologically 
significant elements of the offense. This confuses federal power to 
prohibit certain conduct with the nature of the crime itself.") (citation 
omitted); but cf. Abrams, supra, 9 UCLA L. Rev. at 779 (noting how 
courts do on occasion interpret jurisdictional elements in a statute as 
essential act elements for purposes of determining where the crime was 
committed). 
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Although 18 U.S.C. §924(c)(1) has been held to create an 
offense distinct from the underlying crime, see Anderson, 
59 F.3d at 1326, it is noteworthy that this provision 
prescribes the imposition of a penalty "in addition to the 
punishment provided for [the] crime of violence or drug 
trafficking crime." For this reason, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) has 
been described as constituting, at least in part, a "penalty 
enhancement statute." Anderson, 59 F.3d at 1326. This 
surely demonstrates that a central focus, if not the central 
focus, of the statute is the commission of the underlying 
crime of violence or drug trafficking crime. 
 
It is also telling that eight courts of appeals have held 
that "only one § 924(c)(1) violation can be appended to any 
single predicate crime." Anderson, 59 F.3d at 1328 
(emphasis added); see also United States v. Cappas, 29 
F.3d 1187, 1189 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing cases); United States 
v. Lindsay, 985 F.2d 666, 674 (2d Cir. 1993); United States 
v. Sims, 975 F.2d 1225, 1233 (6th Cir. 1992); United States 
v. Moore, 958 F.2d 310, 312 (10th Cir. 1992); United States 
v. Hamilton, 953 F.2d 1344, 1346 (11th Cir. 1992); United 
States v. Privette, 947 F.2d 1259, 1262-63 (5th Cir. 1991); 
United States v. Fontanilla, 849 F.2d 1257, 1258-59 (9th 
Cir. 1988); but see United States v. Lucas, 932 F.2d 1210, 
1222-23 (8th Cir. 1991). If the use or carrying of the 
firearm were the heart of the offense and the commission of 
the underlying crime of violence or drug trafficking crime 
were a mere appendage that is insufficiently important to 
confer venue, these holdings would be hard to understand. 
Instead, one would expect these courts to have held that 
every single use or carrying of a gun in the context of a 
single drug crime or crime of violence would be a separate 
offense. The contrary holding by eight of the nine circuits to 
have addressed the issue reveals their understanding that 
the underlying predicate offense in Section 924(c)(1) is at 
the center of Congress's aim. See Pomranz, 43 F.3d at 160; 
United States v. Taylor, 13 F.3d 986, 993-94 (6th Cir. 1994) 
("the predicate offense, not the firearm, is the object of 
§ 924(c)(1)"); United States v. Correa Ventura, 6 F.3d 1070, 
1083 (5th Cir. 1993) (the "essence" of the offense was that 
the defendant used a firearm while committing another 
federal crime); but see Corona, 34 F.3d at 880 (predicate 
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drug crime during which the firearm was used was no more 
than a preparatory act and hence could not confer venue). 
 
Moreover, a defendant is at least as likely to have 
significant ties to a place where he is alleged to have 
committed the crime of violence or drug trafficking crime as 
he is to have significant ties to the place where he is alleged 
to have carried or used the firearm. And a defendant's 
alleged commission of a crime of violence or drug trafficking 
crime is at least as likely to present a central issue at trial 
(thus making access to witnesses and proof important) as 
is the element of carrying or using a firearm. For these 
reasons, prosecuting a defendant under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(c)(1) in a district in which the crime of violence or 
drug trafficking crime took place does not involve the type 
of government abuse that the constitutional venue 
provisions were meant to prevent. 
 
Section 924(c)(1)'s legislative history confirms the critical 
importance of the element requiring proof that the 
defendant committed a crime of violence or drug trafficking 
offense. Representative Poff, Section 924(c)(1)'s sponsor, 
stated that this provision targeted "the criminal rather than 
the gun." Anderson, 59 F.3d at 1327 (citing 114 Cong. Rec. 
at 22,231 (1968)). He explained that the provision sought to 
persuade those individuals seeking to commit certain 
felonies "to leave [their] gun[s] at home." Id. at 1328 (citing 
114 Cong. Rec. at 22,231). Indeed, he said that "the 
prosecution for the basic felony and the prosecution under 
my substitute would constitute one proceeding out of which 
two separate penalties may grow." Id. at 1327 (citing 114 
Cong. Rec. at 22, 232) (emphasis added). 
 
In sum, the predicate crimes defined in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(c)(1), crimes of violence and drug trafficking crimes, 
are essential elements of the course of conduct that 
Congress sought to criminalize. I would hold, therefore, 
that venue for a prosecution under this statute lies in any 
district in which the defendant committed the underlying 
crime of violence or drug trafficking offense. 
 
V. 
 
If the majority's adoption of the "verb test" is taken 
seriously and applied in all future venue cases, it will lead 
to difficulties. 
 
                                41 
For one thing, we will have to delve into questions of 
grammar that most of us probably left behind in secondary 
school. The majority suggests that venue questions require 
us to identify the "key verbs" in the statute, but it is not 
clear precisely what it means by a "key verb," a term that 
I do not believe has grammatical significance. Does the 
term "key verb" mean a verb in the main clause? Or does 
it include any verb in a subordinate clause as well? This 
point recently divided the district court and the Fourth 
Circuit in applying the "verb test" to 18 U.S.C. § 228(a), 
which provides in pertinent part as follows (emphasis 
added): 
 
Whoever willfully fails to pay a past due support 
obligation with respect to a child who resides in 
another State shall be punished as provided in 
subsection (b). 
 
The district court focused on the verb in the main clause 
("fails") and held that venue was proper where the payment 
was ordered to be paid, as opposed to where the child 
resided. Murphy v. United States, 934 F. Supp. 736, 739-40 
(W.D. Va. 1996). Reversing, the Fourth Circuit pointed to 
the verb "resides" in the subordinate clause and concluded 
that venue was also proper in the district of the child's 
residence. Murphy, __ F.3d at __, 1997 WL 349887, *3. 
 
Whether or not a verb in a subordinate clause may 
qualify as a "key verb," I assume that a "verbal phrase," i.e., 
a participial, gerund, or infinitive phrase, cannot qualify. As 
a grammar book explains: 
 
Verbals are so called because they are formed from 
verbs. In some respects they act like verbs. They may 
express action; they may have modifiers; and they may 
be followed by complements. In one important respect, 
however, they are not like verbs: verbals are not used 
as verbs in a sentence. They are used as other parts of 
speech -- as nouns, as adjectives, or as adverbs. 
 
John E. Warriner and Francis Griffith, English Grammar 
and Composition 40-41 (1973). 
 
If my assumption is wrong -- if verbal phrases can 
qualify as "key verbs" -- then I challenge the majority to 
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explain why it is proper to look to this type of noun, 
adjective, or adverb (i.e., a verbal serving as a noun, 
adjective, or adverb) and not others. On the other hand, if 
this assumption is right, then the verb test will lead to 
some surprising results. 
 
There are a great many federal criminal statutes that are 
phrased along the following lines: It shall be unlawful to do 
x. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 602, 603, 607(a), 795(a), 842, 922, 
964(a), 1082(a), 1731, 1752(a), 1962, 2342. In all of these 
statutes, the "key verb," I take it, is "shall be" -- which 
cannot possibly show where the offense was committed or 
where it should be prosecuted. The crux of the offense is 
expressed with an infinitive ("to do x") that functions as an 
adverb that modifies the adjective "unlawful." Is it proper 
under the "verb test" to rely on this adverbial phrase? If so, 
why is it not proper in the case before us to rely on the 
adverbial phrase "during and in relation to"? 
 
Consider 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), a statute that, like 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(c)(1), deals with the subject of firearms possession. 
Section 922(g) provides: 
 
It shall be unlawful for any person -- 
 
(1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime 
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one 
year; 
 
(2) who is a fugitive from justice; 
 
(3) who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any 
controlled substance . . . ; 
 
(4) who has been adjudicated as a mental defective or 
who has been committed to a mental institution; 
 
(5) who, being an alien, illegally or unlawfully in the 
United States; 
 
(6) who has been discharged from the Armed Forces 
under dishonorable conditions; 
 
(7) who, having been a citizen of the United States, has 
renounced his citizenship; or 
 
(8) who is subject to [a certain type of court order 
restraining such person from, among other things, 
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harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate partner 
or his or her child]; or 
 
. . . 
 
(9) who has been convicted in any court of a 
misdemeanor crime of domestice violence, 
 
to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, 
or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or 
ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition 
which has been shipped or transported in interstate or 
foreign commerce. 
 
What are the "key verbs" in this statute? Is the only key 
verb the verb "shall be" in the main clause? Or do the verbs 
in the subordinate clauses qualify as well? If so, is venue 
proper where an accused "has been convicted" (§ 922(g)(1)), 
"is a fugitive" (§ 922(g)(2)),"is an unlawful" drug user or 
addict (§ 922(g)(3)), "has been adjudicated as a mental 
defective" or "has been committed to a mental institution" 
(§ 922(g)(4)), etc? Or is it permissible to look to the verbal 
phrases ("to ship or transport," etc.) as well? 
 
Rather than relying on grammatical arcana, we should, 
as I have argued above, look at the substance of the 
statutes in question. Here are two examples of sets of cases 
that exemplify this approach. 
 
The Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. Section 186(a), states in 
relevant part: 
 
(a) It shall be unlawful for any employer or association 
of employers or any person who acts as a labor 
relations expert, adviser, or consultant to an employer 
or who acts in the interest of an employer to pay, lend, 
or deliver, or agree to pay, lend, or deliver, any money 
or other thing of value -- 
 
(1) to any representative of any of his employees who 
are employed in an industry affecting commerce ; or . . . 
 
(emphasis added). The verb in the main clause is "shall be." 
"[A]cts" is the verb in the subordinate clause "who acts. 
. . ." "[T]o pay, lend, . . ." is a verbal phrase that functions 
as an adverb modifying "acts." "[A]ffecting commerce" is 
another verbal phrase, specifically a participial phrase that 
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serves as an adjective modifying "industry." What are the 
"key verbs" in this statute? 
 
In United States v. Billups, supra, the Fourth Circuit said, 
in effect, "We don't care." The court specifically refused to 
apply the "verb test," observing that "this method is not 
exclusive." 692 F.2d at 332. Instead, the court drew an 
analogy to the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, which provides 
in pertinent part: 
 
(a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or 
affects commerce or the movement of any article or 
commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or 
attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens 
physical violence to any person or property in 
furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in 
violation of this section shall be fined . . . or 
imprisoned . . ., or both. 
 
Billups, 692 F.2d at 332 n.10 (emphasis added). 
 
Noting that courts had held that venue in Hobbs Act 
cases was proper wherever commerce was affected, the 
Billups court concluded that the same rule should be 
applied under the Taft Hartley Act. 692 F.2d at 332-33. The 
fact that the Hobbs Act sets out the commerce element by 
means of verbs ("obstructs, delays, or affects"), whereas the 
Taft Hartley Act does not, was of no moment to either the 
Billups court or the other courts that have analogized the 
venue questions under the two acts. See id.; United States 
v. Lewis, 797 F.2d 358, 367 (7th Cir. 1986); United States 
v. Reed, 773 F.2d 477, 482 (2d Cir. 1985). 
 
Two different obstruction of justice statutes, 18 U.S.C. 
§§ U.S.C. 1513 and 1503, present a similar issue. Section 
1513(b) provides: 
 
Whoever knowingly engages in any conduct and 
thereby causes bodily injury to another person or 
damages the tangible property of another person, or 
threatens to do so, with intent to retaliate against any 
person for -- 
 
(1) the attendance of a witness or party at an official 
proceeding, or any testimony given or any record, 
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document, or other object produced by a witness in an 
official proceeding; 
 
shall be fined . . . or imprisoned . . . or both. 
 
(emphasis added). 
 
In United States v. Cofield, 11 F.3d 413 (4th Cir. 1994), 
the court held that even though the defendant's acts of 
retaliation against a witness took place in the District of 
Columbia, venue was proper in the Eastern District of 
Virginia, because that was the location of the underlying 
judicial proceeding in which the witness testified. The court 
reached this conclusion even though there are no verbs in 
Section 1513(b)(1)14 that would place venue in any location 
other than that in which the acts of retaliation or threats 
took place. Id. at 417 (rejecting the use of verb test for 
Section 1513). The Cofield court, however, drew an analogy 
to 18 U.S.C. § 1503, another obstruction of justice statute. 
In cases under this provision, courts had looked to 
congressional purpose in enacting the statute and had held 
that venue was proper, not only where the obstructive acts 
took place, but also where the effects of the obstruction 
were felt, i.e., in the location of the judicial proceeding. 11 
F.3d at 416-17 (citing United States v. Kibler, 667 F.2d 452 
(4th Cir. 1982), and United States v Tedesco, 635 F.2d 902, 
905-06 (1st Cir. 1980)). As in Billups, the Cofield court 
looked to 18 U.S.C. § 1503 for guidance even though that 
provision, unlike the provision before it, contained verbs 
denoting actions that occurred in the district where the 
judicial proceeding took place. See Kibler, 667 F.2d at 454; 
Tedesco, 635 F.2d at 905. Section 1503 provides 
punishment for: 
 
Whoever . . . corruptly, or by threats of force, or by any 
threatening letter or communication, influences, 
obstructs, impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, 
or impede, the due administration of justice . . . . 
 
(emphasis added). However, the Cofield court looked beyond 
these linguistic details and reached its decision based on 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. Section 1513(b)(1) is referred to as Section 1513(a)(1) in Cofield, 11 
F.3d at 416. 
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its view of the nature of the wrongful conduct that 
Congress sought to reach.15 
 
VI. 
 
For these reasons, I would hold that venue in the District 
of New Jersey was proper, and I would therefore affirm 
Moreno's Section 924(c)(1) conviction. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. Two recent circuit cases (ones already discussed in part above) 
involving challenges to convictions under a provision of the Child 
Support Recovery Act of 1992 ("CSRA"), 18 U.S.C. § 228, illustrate the 
importance and relevance of setting forth the correct venue analysis 
here. See Murphy, __ F.3d __, __, 1997 WL 349887 (4th Cir. 1997) and 
United States v. Crawford, 115 F.3d 1397, __, 1997 WL 339295 (8th Cir. 
1997). The CSRA provides that whoever "willfully fails to pay a past due 
support obligation with respect to a child who resides in another State" 
is guilty of a federal crime. 18 U.S.C. § 228(a). The venue issue arises in 
CSRA cases where a defendant is prosecuted for the "failure to pay" in 
a state where his or her child resides, but which is neither the state in 
which the defendant currently resides or the state to which the payment 
is required to be paid under the relevant court order. In both Crawford 
and Murphy, the courts held that venue was proper in the state where 
the child resided, even though the defendant had no connection with 
that state. See Crawford, 115 F.3d at __, 1997 WL 339295, *8, and 
Murphy, __ F.3d at __, 1997 WL 349887, *4. For our purposes, it is 
worth noting that although both Crawford and Murphy found that venue 
was proper in the state of the child's residence under the verb test, 
Crawford explicitly states that the "nature of the crime" venue test might 
be more appropriate than the verb test for venue issues under the CSRA, 
and Murphy acknowledges the validity of the "nature of the crime" test. 
See Crawford, 115 F.3d at __, 1997 WL 339295, *8, and Murphy, __ F.3d 
at__, 1997 WL 349887, * 4 (majority) & *6 (Williams, J., concurring). 
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